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Sexual Harassment of Working Women:
The EEOC Guidelines - Panacea or
Placebo
Motivated by both personal and economic needs, American
women are entering the work force in record numbers. In their
struggle to achieve equality of opportunity in employment, women
have sought and received legislative and administrative support
from government. The United States Congress has enacted legislation which establishes for women a framework of protection
against gender-based discrimination in the workplace.' Sexual harassment2 is one form of gender-based employment discrimination
which has long existed in the workplace s and for which there now
exists a remedy at law. Only recently, however, has it been the subject of discussion in legal literature.'
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),'
recognizing that sexual harassment has become a significant aspect
of employment discrimination, recently issued guidelines on sexual
harassment in the workplace. The guidelines 7 are indicative of
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1972). For text of
the statute see note 11 infra.
2. Some suggested definitions of sexual harassment are found at note 79
infra.
3. See generally C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
(1979). The author offers extensive data to show that this long-existing problem is
widespread. She analyzes sexual harassment from a sociological as well as a legal
point of view and finds that much of the sexual harassment of women in the
workplace is traceable to women's lack of social and economic power.
4. See Comment, Sexual Harassment and Title VII, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 148
(1976); Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundationfor the Elimination
of Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1007
(1978); Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual Harassment, 64 MINN.
L. REV. 151 (1979); Polansky, Sexual Harassment at the Workplace, 8 HUMAN
RIGHTS 14 (1980).
5. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was created by Title
VII of the Civil rights Act, as amended by the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1972).
6. 45 FED. REG. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11).
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 709 of Title
VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitutes sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
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conduct which the EEOC recognizes as violative of federal law.'
implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as a basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the
totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances
and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the facts, on
a case-by-case basis.
(c) Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, employment
agency, joint apprenticeship committee or labor organization [hereinafter
collectively referred to as "employer"] is responsible for its acts and
those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether
the employer knew or should have known of their occurence. The Commission will examine the circumstances of the particular employment relationship and the job junctions (sic) performed by the individual in determining whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or agency
capacity.
(d) With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer
is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and
appropriate corrective action.
(e) An employer may also be responsible for the acts of nonemployees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace,
where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or
should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing these cases the Commission will
consider the extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such
non-employees.
(f) Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, informing employees of their right to raise and
how to raise the issue of sexual harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
(g) Other Related practices: Where employment opportunities or
benefits are granted because of an individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, the employer may
be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination against other persons who
were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or benefit.
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This comment will discuss the development of a cause of action based on sexual harassment in the workplace.' Attention will
be focused on the statutory basis of a cause of action and the interpretation of the statute as reflected in the case law. Analysis of the
EEOC guidelines will focus on their content and public reaction
thereto, the extent to which the guidelines reflect case law, and
possible effects on future litigation.
STATUTORY BASIS FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER TITLE VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
0
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA) guarantees
that workers shall not be subject to certain illegal practices by employers." The original draft of the 1964 legislation did not contain
a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex. This provi-

sion was added shortly before passage of the bill and was not the
subject of legislative hearings.' The legislative history accompany7. For a discussion of the legal force of the guidelines see note 73 and accompanying text infra.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1972).
9. Both men and women can be victims of sexual harassment in the workwomen,
place. However, because the vast majority of victims of this conduct are
women.
working
of
the analysis herein contained will focus on sexual harassment
(1972).
seq.
et
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
11. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964), as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1972).
12. The legislative history reveals that the prohibition against discrimination
based on sex was added in a last-minute attempt to prevent passage of Title VII:
See 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Smith). See generally Wells,
Sex Discriminationand Title VII, 43 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 273 (1975).
The courts have applied the sex-neutral provision of this statute in a number
of employment contexts. See note 23 infra. See also, Diaz v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971):
The amendment adding the work 'sex' to 'race, color, religion and national origin' was adopted one day before House passage of the Civil
Rights Act. It was added on the floor and engendered little relevant debate. In attempting to read Congress' intent in these circumstances, how-
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ing the EEOA reveals that Congress considered gender-based employment discrimination a significant problem. The House Report
states that "discrimination against women is no less serious than
other forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful discrimination."'" All artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary
barriers to employment which operate invidiously to discriminate
on the basis of an impermissible classification are prohibited by
the Act."'
Traditionally, victims of sexual harassment have had to seek
redress through criminal prosecutions, 8 collective bargaining
agreements," and such common law civil actions as contract 7 and
tort. 8 Title VII provides these victims with an additional avenue
of relief. However, it was not until more than ten years after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that suit for sexual harassment
was instituted under Title VII. The courts now recognize this cause
of action and have developed a significant body of case law.
THE CASE LAW
A. Establishing A Cause of Action
One of the first cases to assert a cause of action for sexual
harassment under Title VII was Corne v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., "
decided in 1975. The plaintiffs were clerical workers who alleged
that their supervisor subjected them to repeated verbal and physical sexual advances. The complaint stated that the conduct of the
supervisor constituted sex discrimination and that working condiever, it is reasonable to assume, from a reading of the statute itself, that
one of Congress' main goals was to provide equal access to the job market for both men and women.
13. H.R. Rep. 238, 92d Cong., lot Sess. 5, reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2137.
14. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
15. Meyer v. Graphic Arts International Union, 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 597 (1979) (assault, battery and rape).
16. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (arbitration is a
concurrent, alternative remedy for employment discrimination).
17. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (termination by employer in retaliation for rejection of sexual advances constitutes breach
of employment contract).
18. Doney v. Tambouratgis, 23 Cal. 3d 91, 587 P.2d 1160, 151 Cal. Rptr. 347
(1979) (assault and battery).
19. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated and remanded in an unreported
opinion 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
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0
tions became so intolerable that they were forced to resign." With

no sexual harassment cases on which to rely, the court in Come
cited cases dealing with other aspects of gender-based employment

discrimination, such as inequality in the availability of fringe benefits and inequality in the treatment of married females as com-

pared with married males.' 1 From these cases the court determined

that gender-based discrimination is actionable only when it is the
result of company policy and the employer derives some benefit
from the discriminatory practice." In holding that plaintiffs Come

and DeVane did not have a cause of action the court concluded

20. 390 F. Supp. at 162. Plaintiffs alleged that the repeated verbal and physical sexual advances by a male supervisor toward them and other female employees created a "sex discriminatory condition and a limitation that tends to deprive
the women of equal employment opportunities." In this case, as in many of the
early sexual harassment cases, the court, perhaps because of discomfort with the
subject, described the conduct complained of only in very general terms. Specific
actions of the supervisor which formed the gravamen of the complaint were not
reported.
In Come it was further alleged that administrative personnel knew or should
have known of the supervisor's conduct and therefore the employer was liable for
the conduct. See notes 47-63 and accompanying text infra for discussion of the
doctrine of respondeat superior.
21. 390 F. Supp. at 163. Cases cited by the court include: Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (discrimination against individuals with respect to job assignment or transfer); Ridinger v. General Motors
Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Ohio 1971) (hours of employment); Bartmess v.
Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1971) ("fringe benefits" such as retirement, pension, and death benefits); Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegan Co., 331 F.
Supp. 1184 (D. Pa. 1971) (discrimination against females because they are
married).
22. The court stated:
It would be ludicrous to hold that the sort of activity involved here was
contemplated by the Act because to do so would mean that if the conduct complained of was directed equally to males there would be no basis
for suit. Also, an outgrowth of holding such activity to be actionable
under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another. The
only sure way an employer could avoid such charges would be to have
employees who were asexual.
390 F. Supp. at 163-64.
In determining that the supervisor's conduct was personal in nature and not
of benefit to the company the court stated:
Certainly no employer policy was here involved; rather than the company
being benefited in any way the conduct of (the supervisor), it is obvious
it can only be damaged by the very nature of the acts complained of.
390 F. Supp. at 163.
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that the behavior of the supervisory employee was nothing more
than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism. The supervi-

sor was merely satisfying a personal urge.28

In Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp.," decided in 1978, it was
held that a plaintiff need not prove that conduct constituting sex-

ual harassment is a policy or practice of the employer in order for
such conduct to be actionable." The court held, however, that a
nexus must exist between the conduct complained of and the
terms or conditions of employment."6 The court found that a two

year pattern of sexual demands had developed into a term or condition of employment.' 7 The court held that plaintiff's firing was in
retailiation for her refusal to submit to the sexual demands of her
supervisor. The court found the employer liable for the supervi-

sor's conduct because even though Ms. Heelan had complained
about the offensive conduct on several occasions to a high management official, no corrective action was taken." The dismissal,
therefore, constituted a violation of Title VII," 9 and the employee

Id.

23. The court stated:
[T]here is nothing in the Act which could reasonably be construed to
have it apply to "verbal and physical sexual advances" by another employee, even though he be in a supervisory capacity where such complained of acts or conduct had no relationship to the nature of the
employment.

24. 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978).
25. To demand that a plaintiff prove a company - directed policy of
sexual discrimination is merely to extend a claim for relief with one hand
and take it away with the other. In no other area of employment discrimination do the courts require such proof.
Id. at 1389.
26. 451 F. Supp. at 1388.
27. During the early months of her employment plaintiff received superior
job performance evaluations and was promoted several times, with concomitant
increases in salary. When her supervisor began to demand sexual relations and
plaintiff rebuffed his advances, the promotions stopped and Heelan was fired two
years after the harassing conduct began. Id.
28. Heelan reported supervisor Consigli's conduct to Isabelle Dienstbach, a
corporate vice president and administrative assistant to the president, on several
occasions but no corrective or even investigative action was taken. After receiving
notice of termination Heelan again spoke with Dienstbach who directed plaintiff
to speak with Francis May, an executive vice president and Consigli's immediate
supervisor. May declined to take any action. Id.
29. The court held:
Under the facts of this case, the frequent sexual advances by a supervisor
do not form the basis of the Title VII violation that we find to exist.
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was entitled to relief.80
In order to sustain a cause of action for sexual harassment a
plaintiff must show that there were employment ramifications
flowing directly from the complained of conduct. Even when an
employee has been subjected to conduct which clearly constitutes
sexual harassment there can be no action against the employer for
gender-based discrimination absent a showing of interference with
1
the employment relationship. A case was dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action when employment ramifications arose not at
the time of the harassing conduct but some time thereafter. In
s
Cordes v. County of Yavapai, s a female employee refused the sexual advances of a male employee, but her refusal did not result in
any action against her which interfered with her job performance.
When the male employee later became a supervisor and retaliated
against her by refusing to reappoint her, that action was held not
of sexual
to constitute a violation of Title VII because the granting
88 The court
favors was not a term or condition of employment.
held that while the supervisor's conduct was petty and deplorable,
plaintiff's claim failed because there was no allegation that he
would have34 reappointed her if she had granted the requested sexual favors.

Significantly, termination of plaintiff's employment when the advances
were rejected is what makes the conduct legally objectionable. Receptivity of repeated sexual advances by a high level supervisor was inescapably a condition of the plaintiff's continued employment. The termination of plaintiff's employment as a retaliatory measure when advances
were rejected are within the purview of Title VII.
451 F. Supp. at 1390.
bene30. Plaintiff was found to be entitled to back pay and lost employment
fits. 451 F. Supp. at 1391.
(D. Ariz.
31. Cordes v. County of Yavapai, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1224
654
Supp.
F.
413
Saxbe,
v.
Williams
secretary);
1978) (failure to reappoint a
1240
F.2d
587
Bell,
v.
Williams
nom
sub
grounds
other
on
(D.D.C. 1976) rev'd
(unwar(D.C. Cir. 1978), Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980)
ranted reprimands and finally dismissal).
32. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1224 (D. Ariz. 1978).
Attor33. Plaintiff was employed as a legal secretary in the Yavapai County
Janin
Attorney
County
Yavapai
the
became
Hicks
Billy
ney's Office. Defendant
plainthe
uary 1977. Sometime before assuming office defendant Hicks harassed
Shortly
tiff, attempting to persuade her to commit adultery. Plaintiff refused.
employment.
plaintiff's
terminated
after assuming office Hicks
34. The court stated:
Absent an allegation that defendant Hicks would have reappointed the
plaintiff in January 1977 if she would then have granted sexual favours,
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Although the court will dismiss a suit when ramifications arise

subsequent to harassment, retaliatory action contemporaneous

with the alleged discriminatory conduct is a basis for a cause of
action under Title VII. When an employee refused to submit to a
supervisor's sexual demands she received unwarranted reprimands,
her job-related ideas and suggestions were not considered and she
was dismissed. That dismissal was actionable under Title VII."
When an employer eliminated a job as a retaliatory measure

against a woman who refused to acquiese in her supervisor's sexual
advances, the retaliatory conduct was actionable under Title VII. S
Actual termination of an employee is not necessary to sustain
a cause of action under Title VII. Constructive discharge 7 permits
the defendant did not impose a present condition of employment in a
sexually discriminatory manner.
17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1227.
35. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976) rev'd on other grounds
sub nom Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Plaintiff received positive job performance evaluations at the beginning of her employment. When her
supervisor made sexual advances which she refused, plaintiff began receiving negative evaluations which were used to justify her dismissal. Plaintiff contended
that any decline in the level of her job performance was directly attributable to
her supervisor's conduct in refusing to keep her apprised of information essential
for her job performance and creating an atmosphere in which the sexual pressure
exerted on her interferred with her ability to do her job. Here, as in other cases,
the court does not report specific actions of the supervisor which form the basis of
plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment.
On remand, the District Court, in a memorandum opinion, found a cause of
action under Title VII. This decision was based on records of the first trial and
the administrative agency. Again, the court was not specific about actions of the
supervisor. The fact that it was generally known within the agency that the supervisor against whom plaintiff complained was having an affair with another woman
subordinate was cited by the court as one piece of evidence tending to prove that
"it would be natural for an assumption to develop in the minds of women such as
the plaintiff that submission to the advances of Mr. Brinson (the supervisor)
would smooth the path to promotion." Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387, at
1389 (D.D.C. 1980).
36. Barnes v. Costle, 581 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1977) rev'g Barnes v. Train, 13
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974). The court held that the elimination of
plaintiff's job was in fact an act of discrimination because the record contained no
indication that positions of any other employees were similarly eliminated. 561
F.2d at 989.
37. In Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627 (W.D. Okla.
1980) the court applied the definition of constructive discharge adopted in Young
v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Association, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) which
held that:
The general rule is that if the employer deliberately makes an employee's
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a finding of employer liability, and may be found when a supervisor's conduct creates an intimidating, hostile and offensive working
38
environment. In Brown v. City of Guthrie, the court held that
such conduct constituted an impermissible condition of employment.3 9 Constructive discharge may also be found when a supervi0
sor fails to take timely action on a complaint of harassment." Constructive discharge is now a recognized basis for recovery under
41
Title VII.

Until recently, in order to allege and prove that the conduct

working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation, then the employer has encompassed a constructive
discharge and is liable for any illegal conduct involved therin as if it had
formally discharged the aggrieved employee.
509 F.2d at 144.
38. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1631. In Brown, the conduct complained of
included sexual advances, lewd sexual comments, innuendos and gestures, and
other acts which were derogatory or downgrading to women.
The court also found that the person to whom plaintiff complained of the
harassing conduct had received a similar complaint from a former woman employee and had taken steps to correct the situation. His failure to take any action
in behalf of Brown was clearly a discriminatory act.
39. The court stated that "sexual harassment that permeates the workplace
thereby creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment should
be deemed an impermissible condition of employment." Id. at 1632.
40. In Continental Can Co. v. State of Minnesota, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1808 (Minn. Sp. Ct. 1980), a female employee had complained to her supervisor
on several occasions about episodes of verbal harassment (sexual comments with
racial*overtones such as a white male co-worker saying to a black woman that he
wished slavery would be reinstituted so he could ". . . sexually train her and she
would be his bitch.") Id. at 1811. The incident which triggered litigation involved
a male employee grabbing the woman between the legs. The woman immediately
complained to her supervisor who failed to take any action on the complaint for
sixteen days.
This case was decided on a state statute which is similar to Title VII:
Except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair employment practice; . . . (2) for an employer because of ... sex
...(c) to discriminate against a person with respect to his hire, tenure,
compensation, terms, upgrading conditions, facilities, or privileges of
employment.
Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (c) (1978).
41. One problem which occurs in the case of constructive discharge which is
not an issue in the case of an overt dismissal is the ability of the women to successfully claim unemployment compensation benefits. Such benefits have been
awarded in some but not all cases involving constructive discharge. For an extended discussion of this issue see Unemployment Compensation Benefits for the
Victim of Work-Related Sexual Harassment, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 173 (1980).
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complained of amounted to a term or condition of employment the
plaintiff had to show injury to her employment situation, generally
outright dismissal or constructive discharge.42 This requirement
was modified in 1981 by a unanimous decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In Bundy v. Jackson,4 s the court held, analogyzing to racial discrimination cases,4 4
that the sexually sterotyped insults and demeaning propositions to
which plaintiff was subjected "illegally poisoned" the work environment. 46 Bundy clearly established that Title VII is violated
when the employer creates or condones a substantially discriminatory work environment, regardless of whether the complaining
employee lost any tangible job benefit as a result of the
4
discrimination. "
While a hostile, offensive working environment generally leads
to the recognition of constructive discharge when an employee resigns, Bundy creates a new remedy when victims of sexual harassment choose not to resign. Under Bundy, the harassed employee
has the right to initiate suit while still employed. This is of particular importance to women who like their job but for the harassing
conduct, and who wish to advance within that particular organiza42. See generally text accompanying notes 5-12 supra.
43. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981) rev'g 19 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 828 (D.D.C. 1979).
44. The court specifically cited Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 406 U.S. 957 (1972), for
the principle that conditions of employment include the psychological and emotional work environment.
45. The court specifically held that "sexual harassment, even if it does not
result in loss of tangible job benefits, is illegal sex discrimination." 24 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. at 1163.
46. It must be noted that plaintiff Bundy did allege and prove that she had
suffered monetary damage because of the employer's failure to promote her in
retaliation for her refusal to acquiesce to the supervisor's sexual demands and was
awarded back pay computed to take into account wrongfully delayed and denied
promotions. The court held:
To establish a prima facie case of illegal denial of promotion in retaliation against the plaintiff's refusal of sexual advances by her supervisors
the plaintiff must show (1) that she was a victim of a pattern or practice
of sexual harassment attributable to her employer ...

; and (2) that she

applied for and was denied a promotion for which she was technically
eligible and of which she had a reasonable expectation.
Id. at 1167.
Note must be taken of the fact that Bundy involved a civil service employee.
Civil service promotions are generally related to time in service. It is not yet clear
how this part of the decision will be applied to private sector employment cases.
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tion. Such a remedy also relieves the employee of the burdens of
unemployment and reemployment.
B.

Finding the Employer Liable

Once a valid cause of action has been established, liability
must be allocated. The conduct prohibited by Title VII is a type of
tort47 for which an employer may be held liable under the doctrine
48
The liability of employers for the actions
of respondeat superior.
of their employees has become an essential component of sexual
harassment suits.
The spirit of the common law maxim qui facit per alium facit
per se 4 ' has been adopted by modern commentators.5 0 Knowledge
on the part of the employer of discriminatory conduct will generally permit a finding of liability. 1 To sustain a cause of action for
sexual harassment under Title VII it is not necessary to show that
the employer has actual knowledge of the offensive conduct. Employer's constructive knowledge of the supervisor's conduct has
been held to be sufficient."' However, that section of the EEOC
guidelines which favors the finding of liability predicated on employer's constructive knowledge has drawn sharp criticism. 8
In the 1976 case of Miller v. Bank of America54 the district
court refused to hold the employer liable for sexual advances made
47. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979). "Title VII
and § 1981 define wrongs that are a type of tort, for which an employer may be
liable."

48. See generally W.

ed. 1971).

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

49. He who acts through another acts himself.

458-467 (4th

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1124

(5th ed. 1979).
50. "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219 (1957).
51. "A person has notice of a fact if he knows the fact, has reason to know it,
should know it, or has been given notification of it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 9 (1957).
52. Stringer v. Pensylvania Dept. of Community Affairs, 446 F. Supp. 704
(M.D. Pa. 1978), holds an employer liable for a supervisor's conduct when the
employer has actual or constructive knowledge of the offensive behavior and the
employer fails to take steps to ameliorate the situation. The reported cases do not
inform the question of what, if any, factual showing must be made to support an
allegation of constructive knowledge on the part of the employer. Cf. Tomkins v.
Public Service Electrical & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
53. See 104 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 104-5.
54. 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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by a supervisor toward an employee.8 5 In reversing, the court of
appeals 6 found the supervisor's conduct imputable to the employer. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior the conduct of

the employee was charged to the employer based on constructive

knowledge. 57 The court also held that exhaustion of grievance procedures within the organization was not a prerequisite to the initi-

ation of a Title VII action in the federal courts.' 8 By so finding, the
court reinforced the principle that constructive knowledge is a sufficient basis for finding an employer liable.
An employer may be found liable under Title VII for the con-

duct of its employees without proving that sexual harassment reflects a policy or continued practice of the employer. It was held in
Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, Inc.' 9 that a claim
under Title VII was valid where the complaint alleged sex discrimination based on a denial of plaintiff's request for a promotion or
transfer after she refused to submit to the sexual demands of a
55. The court found that the supervisor's advances were isolated, personal
activities and that the bank had a policy of discouraging sexual advances by supervisors toward employees. As evidence to support this finding the court noted
that the bank's Employee Relations Department could handle complaints such as
Miller's. The court found a policy of affirmatively disciplining employees found
guilty of harassing conduct but there is no evidence in the opinion that any employee had actually been disciplined for such conduct. Id.
56. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
57. The court concluded that:
respondeat superior does apply here, where the action complained of was
that of a supervisor, authorized to hire, fire, discipline or promote, or at
least to participate in or recommend such action, even though what the
supervisor is said to have done violates company policy.
Id. at 212.
In considering the legislative intent of Title VII the appellate court held that
there is no basis for the defendant's assertion that the statute did not intend that
an employer be liable for the acts of an employee:
Most employers today are corporate bodies or quasi-corporate ones such
as partnerships. None of any size, including sole proprietorships, can
function without employees. The usual rule, that an employer is liable
for the torts of its employees, acting in the course of their employment,
seems to us to be just as appropriate here as in other cases, at least
where, as here, the actor is the supervisor of the wronged employee.
Id.
58. The court cited McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
for the principle that while Congress has established certain preconditions to the
initiation of suit under Title VII, use of the employer's personnel procedures is
not one of those preconditions. 600 F.2d at 214.
59. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 224 (D. Alaska 1978).
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senior management official." The court did not find persuasive the
employer's allegation that the supervisor's actions were his own
and not an expression of company policy." In this case the employer had actual notice that the employee was harassed by her
supervisor and the employer refused to take any remedial action.
An essential element of the doctrine of respondeat superioris
the requirement that the employee with whose conduct the employer is charged is acting within the scope of his employment.
The early cases found that sexually offensive conduct by a supervisor was a personal act done outside the scope of his employment.'
A recent case, however, held that when a supervisor takes discriminatory action against an employee which is within the scope of the
supervisor's duties and responsibilities, the action is to be imputed
to the employer. 6
An affirmative duty of an employer to investigate allegations
of sexual harassment was found in Munford v. James T. Barnes &
Co." The court ruled that the employer tacitly supported the discriminatory behavior of a supervisor by ratifying an employee's
dismissal without investigating her allegations of sexual harassment. The court reasoned that the absence of sanctions for such
behavior would encourage the continuation of such conduct."
One court held that in order to recover under Title VII victims
of unwelcome sexual advances in the workplace have the burden of
refusing the advances and reporting the offensive conduct to the
employer. Further, an employee who voluntarily submits to her supervisor's sexual advances cannot later claim that she did so only
out of fear of reprisal. 66 The aggrieved employee may also be
required to report the harassing conduct to the appropriate authorities within the organization.67 However, in Miller v. Bank of
America" the Court held that exhaustion of grievance procedures
60. Id. at 225.
61. Id. at 226.
62. Come v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated and remanded in an unreported opinion, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
63. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) where the court
held the bank liable for supervisor's firing of a female employee after she refused

to acquiesce to his sexual demands because the bank had given the supervisor
authority to hire, fire, discipline or promote.
64. 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
65. Id. at 466.

66. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1980).
67. Id. at 41.
68. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
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within the organization was not a prerequisite to the initiation of a

Title VII action in the federal courts. 9

An employer may avoid liability for the harassing conduct of

its employees if several conditions are met: a clear showing that
the conduct complained of was neither authorized nor acquiesced
in by the employer; the employer has expressly disapproved of the
conduct; and the conduct ended after the employer received the
employee's complaint.7 0 All of these elements must be proved to
relieve the employer of liability.

ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDELINES

In issuing the guidelines on sexual harassment in the workplace the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission intended to
emphasize its concern for the problem of sexual harassment, specify types of conduct which constitute sexual harassment and encourage employers to take affirmative steps to prevent the occurence of this conduct. Interim interpretive guidelines were
published on April 11, 1980.7" The guidelines took effect upon promulgation of the interim rules. However, the EEOC solicited and

received comments from the public, and in their final form the
guidelines are somewhat revised. 2
While the sexual harassment guidelines are interpretive rather
than legislative rules, 7a courts may find them persuasive. 7 ' Notwithstanding the fact that courts have the power to substitute
69. Id. at 214.
70. Price v. John F. Lawhon Furniture Co., 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8342 (N.D.
Ala. 1978), finding that:
defendant's express disapproval of the type of sex discrimination alleged
is evidenced not only by the contents of the rule book distributed to its
employees, but also by the fact that when plaintiff threatened to report
her supervisor's misconduct, the misconduct abruptly subsided.
Id. at 8343.
71. 45 Fed. Reg. 25,025 (1980).
72. For text of final interpretive guidelines see note 6 supra.
The guidelines were adopted in their final form by the EEOC on September
23, 1980 but were not published in the Federal Register until November 10, 1980.
Time to accomplish interagency coordination necessitated the time lag. 45 Fed.
Reg. 74,677 (1980).
73. "A legislative rule is the product of delegated legislative power to make
law through rules. An interpretive rule is any rule an agency issues without exercising delegated legislative power to make law through rules." K. DAVIs, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:8 (2d ed. 1978).
74. See notes 93-105 and accompanying text, infra.
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their judgment for that of the administrative agency, the interpretation of the issuing agency is often adopted judicially.78
Section (a) of the guidelines defines sexual harassment as

follows:

Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an indivual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.7 6

This section has been criticized as being too vague;7 7 commentators have expressed a desire for greater specificity7 8 and have offered alternative definitions of sexual harassment. 79 The principles
75. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the United States Supreme Court considered the question of how much weight was to be accorded
EEOC interpretive guidelines informing § 703(h) of Title VII. This section discusses permissible testing procedures. Interpreting the intent of Congress in passing Title VII as "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification." (Id. at 431). The court held that
"The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled
to great deference." Id. at 433-34.
Cf. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), holding that interpretive guidelines are entitled to consideration in determining legislative intent.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) where the court held that "while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [interpretive rules] do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Id. at 140.
76. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)).
77. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
78. The EEOC's definition of sexual harassment is disturbing to some
management lawyers who say it is ambiguous and too broad. 'There is a
dangerous vagueness to EEOC's attempt to get at verbal conduct,' said
Alan Koral of Vedder, Price, Kaufman, Kammholz & Day in New York.
'There ought to be more guidance as to what kind of verbal actions are
prohibited. If an employee goes around telling his male peers about his
sexual exploits and that offends another worker, is that sexual
harassment?'
Huffman, Sex Harassment Regs Called Ambiguous, LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON, 2 (April 14, 1980).
79. National Organization for Women and the Working Women's Institute
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set forth in this section are not new. Case law has established that
a cause of action under Title VII exists when submission to sexual
advances is a term or condition of employment and when submission to or rejection of such advances is used as a basis for employment decisionsso The final category in this section, which defines
sexual harassment as the creation of a hostile or offensive working
environment is a newly evolving principle. 81
Section (b)8 provides that the court should examine the totality of the circumstances to determine the existence of sexual harassment. This section provides no guidance for employers seeking
to conform to the spirit of the guidelines or for victims assessing
the probabilities that a contemplated suit will be successful.
The doctrine of respondeat superior is embodied in section
(c). 83 This principle is well established by case law analyzing claims
of gender-based employment discrimination. 84 The case law, however, addresses only the issue of employer liability for the acts of
supervisors.
Liability for the acts of nonsupervisory personnel is announced in section (d).85 Historically, courts have refused to find
the employer liable for the actions of nonsupervisory personnel. 6
urge the following definition:
Sexual harassment is any repeated or unwanted verbal or sexual advances, sexually-explicit derogatory statements, or sexually discriminatory remarks made by anyone in the workplace which is offensive or objectionable to the recipient or which causes the recipient discomfort or
humiliation or which interferes with the recipient's job performance.
Levin and Brossman, Sexual Harassment on the Job: Title VII & EEOC to the
Rescue, 2 NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 26 (June 2, 1980).
80. See text accompanying notes 24-34 supra.
81. See text accompanying note 46 supra. In Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co.,
461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978) a woman alleged that co-workers created a hostile
and offensive atmosphere by publically speculating about her virginity and placing an obscene cartoon on her desk. While this was a tort claim alleging interference with plaintiff's right to work rather than an action under Title VII, the recognition of a cause of action flowing from the creation of a hostile and offensive
atmosphere by acts of sexual harassment is notable.
82. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)).
83. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)).
84. See text accompanying notes 47-63 supra.
85. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)).
86. In Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55, 72 (E.D. Pa.
1977), the court, in addressing the problem of racial harassment said, quoting
Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Div.), 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1192 (E.D. Pa. 1977):
Acts of fellow employees are not usually bases of claims against the employer. Liability can only be premised on the employer's failure to take
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The Minnesota Supreme Court recently addressed this issue and
held an employer liable for the actions of nonsupervisory employees.8 7 In finding liability the court noted that the employer had
failed to respond in a timely fashion when informed of the offensive conduct.8 8
The principle of employer liability for the acts of non-employin section (e)89 has not yet been litigated. Claims
embodied
ees
arising under this provision will be considered on a case-by-case
basis. Knowledge, actual or constructive, on the part of the employer is a prerequisite for finding an employer liable for the
harassing acts of non-employees.
In addition to addressing the question of employer liability for
the acts of its employees and others, 90 the guidelines also instruct
employers to take affirmative steps to prevent conduct which constitutes a violation of Title VII.91 Section (f)92 represents a general
admonition to employers to take steps to increase their employees'
awareness of the problem of sexual harassment in the workplace.
The Commission instructs employers to educate employees as to
the kind of conduct which constitutes sexual harassment and the
avenues of relief available to the victims of such conduct.
CASES CONSIDERING THE GUIDELINES

The EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment in the workplace
have come under judicial scrutiny in several recent cases. In Brown
v. City of Guthrie93 the court cited the guidelines as indicia of current employment standards," and expressed the5 position that the
guidelines are entitled to serious consideration.'
reasonable steps to prevent racial harassment of which its upper level
management is aware.
87. Continental Can Co. v. State of Minnesota, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1808
(Minn. Sup. Ct. 1980).
88. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
The approach taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court is reminiscent of the
ratification approach taken by the district court in Munford v. James T. Barnes &
Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977). See text accompanying note 65 supra.
89. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e)).
90. See generally, notes 83-88 and accompanying text, supra.
91. See text accompanying note 105 infra.
92. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)).
93. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
94. "The new guideline reaffirms the Commission's position that sexual harassment is an unlawful employment practice under Title VII." Id. at 1631.
95. Id., n.2.
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Continental Can Co. v. State of Minnesota9 was decided on

the basis of state law97 rather than Title VII, but the court noted

that federal precedents were instructive."s As such, the EEOC
guidelines were accorded significant weight because they indicate
the prevailing interpretation of prohibited employment practices. 99
Plaintiff in Clark v. World Airways, Inc. 100 alleged that employer's president's sexual advances toward her created a term or
condition of employment which was cognizable under Title VII. 1'0
The court found no merit in Clark's Title VII claim and dismissed
the suit. In dicta the court stated that the EEOC guidelines were
entitled to little consideration because of their interim status. 102
No indication was given as to the weight which would be accorded
the final guidelines.
The final guidelines on sexual harassment in the workplace
were cited with approval by the court in the case of Bundy v.
Jackson.103 The definition of sexual harassment set out by the
EEOC was adopted by the court,'0 4 and plaintiff's employer was
specifically instructed to undertake a program of prevention as
delineated in section (f) of the guidelines. 108
96. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1808 (Minn. 1980).
97. See note 40 supra.
98. "Principles developed in Title VII cases by federal courts are instructive
and have been applied by this Court when construing the Minnesota Act." 22 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1812.
99. Id. at 1813.
100. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 305 (D.D.C. 1980).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 308.
The refusal of the Court to credit the guidelines is of diminished importance
in light of the fact that no Title VII violation was found in this case.
103. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'g 19 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 828 (D.D.C. 1979).
104. Id. at 1162.
105. See 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)).
In Bundy, the court issued the following instruction to plaintiff's employer:
Applying these Guidelines to the present case, we believe that the Director of the agency should be ordered to raise affirmatively the subject of
sexual harassment with all his employees and inform all employees that
sexual harassment violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Guidelines of the EEOC, the express orders of the Mayor of the District
of Columbia, (footnoted omitted) and the policy of the agency itself. The
Director should also establish and publicize a scheme whereby harassed
employees may complain to the Director immediately and confidentially.
The Director should promptly take all necessary steps to investigate and
correct any harassment, including warnings and appropriate discipline
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CONCLUSION

To date there has been little judicial interpretation of the
EEOC sexual harassment guidelines. It is therefore far from clear
whether the guidelines will be adopted as the standard against
which allegedly discriminatory conduct will be measured. In issuing the guidelines, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has emphasized its concern for the jroblem of sexual harassment in the workplace. Many provisions of the guidelines are
restatments of case law but some of the provisions represent new
interpretations of discriminatory conduct.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is and will continue to be
a significant area of judicial activity. As the courts continue to decide employment discrimination cases based on claims of sexual
harassment in the workplace, the impact of the EEOC guidelines
will become more evident.
BARBARA WEST

directed at the offending party, and should generally develop other
means of preventing harassment within the agency.
24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1163.

